Clyde Barrow's Sawn-Off BAR

[DusterBoy]

Re: Clyde Barrow's Sawn-Off BAR

 

And in the MP44 can be seen the basis of all Heckler & Koch designs.

[Lawnmower Boy]

Re: Clyde Barrow's Sawn-Off BAR

 

Not sure this is the correct forum, but I disagree.

First, WWI squads were 8 men, for almost all the participants. WWII squads were also about that size, except for the US.

Two, British Commonwealth squads used the BREN gun, which was magazine fed like the BAR, and so was not really a LMG. (Yes, it was easier for an assistant to reload than the BAR, but still not a LMG.)

Three, the reason the US squad did not center all its tactics around the automatic weapon was that with the M1 semiautomatic rifle, the US squad had much more firepower. The effective rate of fire with a springfield (bolt action) rifle was about 10 rpm (rounds per minute); with an M1 it was 30.

Four, the Germans used squads without LMGs in the units that had the MP44 (first assault rifle, the AK-47 is basically a copy of it).

 

I don't doubt that you're right about the basic WWI infantry formation, Yansuf, but I'm going to stand my ground on two positions that seem important.

First, the French clearly need to be given credit for recognising the change in the nature of infantry warfare and basing new infantry organisations on the LMG.

Second, the United States really did fight WWII with the wrong organisation on the ground. An article in Journal of Military History even resolved the long debate over S. L. A. Marshall's findings by explaining that too many riflemen were just standing around while the BAR section did the work. (I may be wrong, but I think that this is the article: http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=K71HVPp5J6ndXVng7y31BvmcvkQgX6LCVTF0y2QCzKJ0CJ1jr2QN!1273633868!-1334397701?docId=5002560343)

The problem is simple --opportunities for fire. An LMG concentrates the section firepower at a single point, vital in the artillery-dominated battlefield. Imagine a hole in a hedge, a culvert, the concealment of a shock of wheat in a field. Whatever: the point is limited concealment/protection.

Even if there were room for 10 riflemen (with or without semiautomatic rifles), they shouldn't be there. You're risking their lives against artillery to no good purpose. The fire position should be occupied by the LMG team, with the supporting riflemen dispersed on its flanks. (And if they are armed with assault rifles or additional BARs all the better.) That's why the United States Army cut the rifle squad strength prior to Korea, even though it did not yet have a true LMG to arm it with.

http://books.google.ca/books?id=NpOp2OO1-DAC&pg=PA20&lpg=PA20&dq=United+States+squad+organization+korean+war&source=bl&ots=Zixx95NXFv&sig=UOcTG_wcBRLcV2UnnWmkoAu60Yo&hl=en&ei=NsO7SobNMYfatgPY8f26BA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#v=onepage&q=&f=false

 

Now, the problem here is straightfoward. Up until 1950, the European powers spent far more on defence (at least per capita, and more effectively, since wages were lower) than the United States. As a result, countries like France and Germany, but even the United Kingdom, had far more vigorous weapon design communities, amongst other things, than the United States.

American generals, however, remember that thing about the priority of policy. They did not say, in the 1930s, that "Congress is not giving us enough money to develop new LMGs/AA artillery/aircraft/shellmaking plant/fire control equipment/demolition explosives/ [on and on]." They're not there to start military coups. They're there to defend America with what Congress gives them on the basis of the risk analysis that is Congress' job. They said, and you can find this quote again and again in contemporary media, that American soldiers had the best equipment in the world.

And they said it even when it was ludicrously wrong, because that was their job. When you find the commander of the AA branch saying that the army's improvised WWI 75mm cannon-turned AA gun was the best in the world at the same time that the UK and Germany were rolling out the 3.7" and 88mm, you realise that defending the 13 man/1 BAR ratio on the grounds of effectiveness hardly made noses grow at all.

 

That said, what was defensible then is a little bit less defensible now. I've seen any number of arguments that make out, somehow, that the US infantry was just perfectly equipped in WWII . But the notion that the "Bren gun wasn't a real LMG neither," is a new one on me. And the fact that the Germans deployed infantry sections without LMGs is not evidence that they didn't need one, because volume of fire is not, as I've noted, the issue.

[Yansuf]

Re: Clyde Barrow's Sawn-Off BAR

 

I don't doubt that you're right about the basic WWI infantry formation, Yansuf, but I'm going to stand my ground on two positions that seem important.

First, the French clearly need to be given credit for recognising the change in the nature of infantry warfare and basing new infantry organisations on the LMG.

Second, the United States really did fight WWII with the wrong organisation on the ground. An article in Journal of Military History even resolved the long debate over S. L. A. Marshall's findings by explaining that too many riflemen were just standing around while the BAR section did the work. (I may be wrong, but I think that this is the article: http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=K71HVPp5J6ndXVng7y31BvmcvkQgX6LCVTF0y2QCzKJ0CJ1jr2QN!1273633868!-1334397701?docId=5002560343)

The problem is simple --opportunities for fire. An LMG concentrates the section firepower at a single point, vital in the artillery-dominated battlefield. Imagine a hole in a hedge, a culvert, the concealment of a shock of wheat in a field. Whatever: the point is limited concealment/protection.

Even if there were room for 10 riflemen (with or without semiautomatic rifles), they shouldn't be there. You're risking their lives against artillery to no good purpose. The fire position should be occupied by the LMG team, with the supporting riflemen dispersed on its flanks. (And if they are armed with assault rifles or additional BARs all the better.) That's why the United States Army cut the rifle squad strength prior to Korea, even though it did not yet have a true LMG to arm it with.

http://books.google.ca/books?id=NpOp2OO1-DAC&pg=PA20&lpg=PA20&dq=United+States+squad+organization+korean+war&source=bl&ots=Zixx95NXFv&sig=UOcTG_wcBRLcV2UnnWmkoAu60Yo&hl=en&ei=NsO7SobNMYfatgPY8f26BA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#v=onepage&q=&f=false

 

Now, the problem here is straightfoward. Up until 1950, the European powers spent far more on defence (at least per capita, and more effectively, since wages were lower) than the United States. As a result, countries like France and Germany, but even the United Kingdom, had far more vigorous weapon design communities, amongst other things, than the United States.

American generals, however, remember that thing about the priority of policy. They did not say, in the 1930s, that "Congress is not giving us enough money to develop new LMGs/AA artillery/aircraft/shellmaking plant/fire control equipment/demolition explosives/ [on and on]." They're not there to start military coups. They're there to defend America with what Congress gives them on the basis of the risk analysis that is Congress' job. They said, and you can find this quote again and again in contemporary media, that American soldiers had the best equipment in the world.

And they said it even when it was ludicrously wrong, because that was their job. When you find the commander of the AA branch saying that the army's improvised WWI 75mm cannon-turned AA gun was the best in the world at the same time that the UK and Germany were rolling out the 3.7" and 88mm, you realise that defending the 13 man/1 BAR ratio on the grounds of effectiveness hardly made noses grow at all.

 

That said, what was defensible then is a little bit less defensible now. I've seen any number of arguments that make out, somehow, that the US infantry was just perfectly equipped in WWII . But the notion that the "Bren gun wasn't a real LMG neither," is a new one on me. And the fact that the Germans deployed infantry sections without LMGs is not evidence that they didn't need one, because volume of fire is not, as I've noted, the issue.

 

We are getting way off the original topic.

I will PM you.